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grams, and the centerpiece of our 




We wanted the certificate program 
to be accessible to those without a 
deep technical background and to 
be available to part-time students. 
Our first task was to determine the 
material that the courses would 
cover for the certificate. Biomet-
rics was an obvious choice; it pro-
vides a way to bind an identity to a 
physical person. Another easily de-
termined area was the infrastruc-
ture required to provide highly 
distributed, efficient use of identi-
ties to support various functions.
In addition, people involved in 
practical IDM must understand 
the laws and policies pertaining to 
the collection, storage, and man-
agement of identity information. 
Because IDM is an emerging area 
in which some of our graduates 
might develop policy, we wanted 
students to not only know about 
existing policies but also be able 
to reason about policy concepts 
from both national and interna-
tional perspectives.
Finally, IDM involves col-
lecting and managing identity 
information in the field. Some 
scenarios are obvious—for ex-
ample, when someone applies for a 
government-issued identifier, var-
ious kinds of identity information, 
such as birth records, are required. 
More challenging might be the 
correlation of fingerprints from 
an individual with those obtained 
from a crime scene or an impro-
vised explosive device (IED). To 
have dramatically affected our 
ability to identify individuals sole-
ly on the basis of such evidence. As 
one dog said to the other in a New 
Yorker cartoon, “On the Internet, 
nobody knows you’re a dog.”1 
How do you establish identity be-
fore granting access to the prem-
ises or to protected information? 
In addition, establishing whether 
a person has been involved in 
unlawful behavior is sometimes 
useful. For example, if a weapon 
is left at a crime scene, can inves-
tigators compare the fingerprints 
on the weapon to those of known 
criminals and suspects?
A major challenge in computer- 
enabled systems and networks is 
binding the identity of the per-
son outside the computer to the 
logical entities executing on the 
person’s behalf. Increased user mo-
bility combined with a variety of 
platforms for conducting work has 
raised concerns regarding the na-
ture of the devices that deliver and 
manage information. Furthermore, 
autonomous devices, such as those 
in embedded or sensor systems, 
must be identified. To address iden-
tity in the federal sector, require-
ments have been levied throughout 
the US government. Most notable 
of these is Homeland Security Pres-
idential Directive 12, which calls 
for “a mandatory, government-
wide standard for secure and reliable 
forms of identification issued by the 
federal government to its employ-
ees and to the employees of federal 
contractors.”2 The US government 
has extended similar requirements 
to encompass things—for example, 
computers, laptops, mobile devices, 
and sensors.
Identification and authentication 
of individuals accessing computer 
systems have always been compo-
nents of cybersecurity. What’s new 
is the complex technology required 
for both personal-identity verifica-
tion3 and our growing ability to 
rapidly identify and possibly link 
individuals with other evidence. 
The introduction of “things,” more 
transitory than the people using 
them, creates additional technical 
complexity. Ample opportunity 
exists for misunderstandings, con-
fusion, and the construction of 
costly but ineffective systems.
A clear need exists to appreciate 
the requirements and supporting 
technologies for, as well as the use 
of, identity management (IDM) 
systems. In response, the US Na-
val Postgraduate School (NPS) has 
established a comprehensive IDM 
education program that includes 
training and awareness, executive 
education, graduate-degree pro-
H
istorically, people established identity  using 
simple attributes. They determined group 
membership through factors such as language, 
dress, ethnicity, and behavior, as well as refer-
rals by other group members. Globalization and heterogeneity 
















address these topics, we needed to 
discuss IDM’s operational aspects.
These considerations led to a 
six-month program comprising 
four graduate-level courses.
Motivation for  
IDM Topics
IDM technology both enables and 
constrains policy and operations, 
and vice versa. We decided that by 
examining the things that could go 
wrong without IDM, our courses 
would provide a strong motivation.
Biometrics
First, we examined biometrics. 
Over the past two millennia, multi-
ple societies independently invented 
biometrics to solve common prob-
lems. How can you prove some-
one’s claim of identity? How can 
you determine whether this person 
has been seen before? Modern bio-
metrics uses technology to keep up 
with the size of the populations and 
to make quicker, cheaper decisions.
For thousands of years, people 
have also been using passwords 
to prove identity by establishing a 
shared secret in advance. Modern 
technology incorporates passwords 
to solve the verification problem, 
but they have various disadvantages:
• They must be memorized.
• They can be written down to 
solve the memorization prob-
lem, which leaves them vulner-
able for others to find.
• They can be shared on purpose, 
but perhaps in violation of policy.
• They can be observed while be-
ing entered.
• They can be guessed.
• They can be calculated if the pass-
word database is compromised.
• People are somehow supposed to 
remember a different password 
for each computer account.
The most common problem 
for IT help desks is forgotten pass-
words, which translates into a large 
administrative expense. So, using 
passwords for verification gives 
only low confidence that it proves a 
claimed identity, yet incurs high or-
ganizational support costs. If pass-
words protect sensitive data, their 
disadvantages can have disastrous 
effects, whether personal (identity 
theft) or national (state secrets).
Exacerbating the problems pass-
words pose for verification, they 
can’t begin to solve the identifica-
tion problem because often an un-
cooperative person, a nonpresent 
person (for example, a latent finger-
print), or a corpse must be identi-
fied quickly and reliably. Without 
biometrics, the wrong prison in-
mate might be released,4 the wrong 
suspect in a crime might be identi-
fied,5 or someone’s remains might 
not be identified to give closure to 
a grieving family.6 Balanced use of 
biometrics, including the careful 
management of biometric informa-
tion, lets us solve the verification 
and identification problems without 
adding the difficulty of managing 
secrets. Of course, biometrics de-
pends on a sound infrastructure.
Infrastructure
Often, a flaw in identification or 
authentication lies at the core of 
network vulnerabilities. When 
IDM has been applied to devic-
es, many potential, and realized, 
failures have (or could have) led 
to attacks. Such attacks can tar-
get information confidentiality, 
integrity, or availability. Addi-
tionally, because some physical 
infrastructure (for example, pow-
er, water, and transportation) 
components might be monitored 
and controlled via the Internet, 
attacks on their process control 
systems can lead directly to physi-
cal damage or disruption.
We now describe seven moti-
vating IDM infrastructure issues.
DNS cache poisoning. This at-
tack delivers fallacious IP addresses 
associated with server names (fully 
qualified domain names) to Do-
main Name System (DNS) servers. 
DNS servers accepting these “up-
dates” facilitate the attacker’s goal 
of redirecting traffic to a computer 
of the attacker’s choosing. Because 
most DNS information isn’t au-
thenticated, anyone can imperson-
ate a DNS server and provide false 
name-to-IP address mappings.
Dynamic routing protocols. Most 
routers run protocols that sup-
port the collective sharing of route 
table information. This informa-
tion influences the path that pack-
ets traverse. Because most routers 
don’t authenticate route informa-
tion received from other routers, 
an attacker can create false route 
information and deliver it to legi-
timate routers.
Specious equipment. Recently, 
criminals placed legitimate Cisco 
Systems serial-number placards on 
networking gear manufactured in 
China, then sold the gear to unwary 
buyers.7 This subverted supply- 
chain integrity and increased the 
risk of intentionally installed hard-
ware or software artifices.
RFID-enabled payment systems. 
Because most RFID implemen-
tations for payment systems (for 
example, in toll booths) employ 
passive chips, processing power is 
extremely limited, and inclusion 
of any authentication protocol is 
rare. So, an attacker can capture 
and replay payment account data, 
causing unauthorized charges.
RFID-enabled passports. The 
combination of RFID and ID 
documents potentially facilitates 
identification, tracking, and tar-
geted cueing of electronic IDs. 
This example highlights a case in 
which anonymity might be de-
sired in an IDM implementation.
“IP-enabled” process control. 
Some process control sensors and 
actuators (for example, distributed 
control systems and supervisory 
control and data acquisition sys-
tems) are accessible over public net-
Education
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works, including the Internet. The 
potential for attacks is greatly exac-
erbated when no authentication is 
required before device access.
EMV chips and PINs. Implementa-
tion of card-to-ATM authentication 
by EMV (Europay, MasterCard, 
and Visa) has proven vulnerable 
to a relatively simple man-in-the-
middle attack that subverts the au-
thentication.8 This allows any PIN 
to be accepted as valid.
Identity Management 101
Before the courses start, we give a 
three-hour lecture called Identity 
Management 101 to introduce the 
students to IDM’s many dimensions.
The lecture begins with an 
overview of six core IDM topics. 
First, we define IDM. We present 
two example definitions based only 
on persons, then expand the defini-
tion to address nonhuman entities.
Next, we introduce a 2 × 2 ma-
trix. On one dimension are iden-
tification and verification; on the 
other are humans and nonhuman 
entities. Both “human quadrants” 
are easily understood; however, 
verification of a nonhuman entity 
often challenges students with less 
technical backgrounds. We ex-
plain this quadrant by illustrating 
a logon based on the Common 
Access Card (CAC), showing the 
two constituent authentications: 
CAC to cardholder and server to 
CAC. The CAC and server are 
clearly nonhuman. Identification 
of a nonhuman entity is the least 
familiar quadrant. We explain it 
with two examples: metallurgical 
analysis of IED fragments to help 
identify the manufacturer, and bit 
string analysis of binary code to 
identify a known computer virus.
Our third topic centers on se-
curity services enabled by IDM 
mechanisms. For identification, 
this is simply the removal of ano-
nymity. For verification, the re-
sulting proof of an identity claim 
enables the spectrum of security 
controls dedicated to access con-
trol and audit. When the underly-
ing protocol employs asymmetric 
cryptography and time stamps, 
nonrepudiation can also be sup-
ported at the technical level.
The fourth topic is subject en-
rollment. Given the relative ease 
of forging “breeder” documents, 
such as birth certificates, some 
consider enrollment to be IDM’s 
weakest link. A “Bob Old ver-
sus Bob New” scenario facilitates 
thoughtful discussion. A man “le-
gally” named Bob Old presents 
specious documents identifying 
himself as Bob New, which the 
registrar accepts. If his new cre-
dential entails biometric binding, 
he is now and forever associated 
with this new name. Furthermore, 
the enrollment date is on record, 
so any association of that identity 
with this person’s history before 
that date remains open to question.
The fifth topic contrasts bio-
metric and secret-based authen-
tication. Students learn that 
biometric information is unique to 
a person, is always with that per-
son, and can’t easily be changed. In 
typical use, biometric verification 
is optimal in local applications in 
which the user is physically pres-
ent and provides the “raw” analog 
biometric information directly to 
the verifier. Otherwise, a risk of 
a replay attack exists. For remote 
applications or local applications 
that haven’t been biometrically 
enabled, proof of possession of a 
secret is the basis for verification. 
We examine secret-based verifi-
cation’s strengths and weaknesses: 
its scalability and flexibility versus 
insufficient bit entropy and imple-
mentation flaws that can leak in-
formation related to the secret.
The last topic names the prin-
ciple IDM roles. Once the subject 
registers, he or she becomes a sub-
scriber. A subscriber engaging in 
a transaction becomes a claimant. 
The party with a stake in a claim’s 
veracity is the relying party. The 
verifier checks a claim’s veracity. 
The credential service provider binds 
identity attributes to an identity 
credential. We use various scenar-
ios to illustrate these roles.
Course Content
Each of the four courses covers 
one of the areas we mentioned in 
the section “Determining What 
to Cover.”
Biometrics
This course reviews the technical 
details of biometric identification 
and verification. It covers the ma-
jor approaches (for example, fin-
gerprints and irises) with respect 
to acquisition of biometric data, 
matching techniques, antispoofing 
techniques, and current standards. 




This course addresses using IDM in 
real-world settings and the largely 
managerial and social aspects of 
IDM related to actual implemen-
tations. It provides an operational 
overview of the tactical and stra-
tegic advantages derivable from 
a properly designed and operated 
IDM program. It presents generic 
descriptions of both identification 
and verification use cases, followed 
by the review of several specific 
fielded IDM programs. The course 
addresses repositories for identity 
information and the use of open 
standards for exchanging that in-
formation. It also analyzes using 
context, error probabilities, and 
other factors as components of 




This course covers the technologies 
necessary to support e-authentica-
tion and the secure transfer of bio-
metric information. It also addresses 
the identity of platforms, devices, 
sensors and other “things.” It cov-
ers a broad range of topics related to 
the standards, protocols, technolo-
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gy, and management infrastructure 
necessary to field an enterprise-level 
IDM solution. Lecture and reading 
assignments span the gamut of IDM 
issues, from low-level authentica-
tion protocol mechanics to high-
level identity federation initiatives.
Identity  
Management Policy
This course addresses the over-
arching guidelines, standards, and 
laws influencing IDM implemen-
tations. It assesses any given IDM 
program’s life cycle (provision, 
distribution, operation, and depro-
vision) against policy, laws, and 
regulations pertinent to the estab-
lishment, collection, distribution, 
and maintenance of identification 
credentials. Of particular interest 
is the proper scoping of IDM or-
ganizational and technical policy 
so as to balance the often conflict-
ing goals of security and privacy 
protection while maintaining and 
exchanging personally identifiable 
information.
Hybrid Course Delivery
We loosely modeled our program 
on an existing NPS program, 
despite our fewer resources. We 
teach the courses in a hybrid de-
livery mode that lets students 
meet ongoing work responsibili-
ties while enrolled in classes. This 
mode combines traditional class-
room lectures and labs with Web-
based instruction. The on-campus 
instruction acclimates students 
to graduate studies and builds a 
feeling of team membership that 
creates a sense of obligation to 
complete the course work.
The first week of course work 
is onsite. Activities include Identity 
Management 101, invited talks and 
presentations, and extensive lec-
tures and exercises for the first two 
courses (Biometrics and Identity 
Management Operations). Approx-
imately nine weeks of asynchro-
nous Web-based instruction follow. 
Then, students return to the class-
room for more lectures, presenta-
tions, lab exercises, and final exams. 
We’ve arranged the schedule so that 
students segue into the next two 
courses (Identity Management In-
frastructure and Identity Manage-
ment Policy) in the following week 
with a full slate of classroom work. 
This, again, is followed by Web-
based instruction. After another 
nine weeks, the students return for 
more on-location study and com-
pletion of the certificate program.
A Web-based content manage-
ment server linked to the course 
website supports both course 
management and instruction. The 
server includes tools to support 
group discussions, access to course 
materials, and quizzes.
W e launched the certificate program in September 2008. 
Cohorts of between 20 and 25 
students convene quarterly. Par-
ticipants come from a range of US 
Department of Defense and fed-
eral agencies, many with locations 
across the US and overseas. By Sep-
tember 2010, 143 students in nine 
cohorts had enrolled, and seven co-
horts (114 students) had completed 
all four courses. The attrition rate 
was 10 percent, which compares 
favorably to the attrition rates of 
43 percent or higher in traditional 
distance-learning programs. We 
attribute the program’s success to a 
combination of engaging material 
and the hybrid delivery model. To 
continue with a degree program 
that builds on the IDM certificate, 
students can enroll in the NPS Mas-
ter of Arts in Identity Management 
and Cybersecurity program. 
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